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The Doctrine of Recrimination
In Nebraska
Janice L. Gradwohl*
The American courts of equity and their predecessors, the
English ecclesiastical courts, are the progenitors of a doctrine known
as recrimination, which is, in essence, "a rule which precludes one
spouse from obtaining a divorce from the other where the spouse
seeking the divorce has himself or herself been guilty of conduct
which would entitle the opposite spouse to a divorce."' In recent
years, however, there has been a tendency in a few courts to modify
this doctrine, or to abandon it completely. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska, which has, through a somewhat erratic evolution; ac-
cepted the recrimination rule even beyond its statutory bounds,
has recently shown some tendency to relax its application of the
doctrine.2 Whether this can be interpreted as an abandonment of
the view shown by the weight of American authority, and a step
toward a rejection of the doctrine of recrimination cannot be deter-
mined from the present cases. However, it does afford a timely
opportunity for an analysis of the doctrine. The purpose of this
study, therefore, is to examine the various manifestations of recrim-
ination in the State of Nebraska as compared with its application
in other jurisdictions, and to suggest a future legislative approach
to the problem of mutual guilt in the divorce situation.
* B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1954, University of Nebraska; member Nebraska Bar As-
sociation; presently associated with Max Kier, Lincoln, Nebr.
I Nelson, Divorce and Annulment 10.01 (2d ed. 1945). For further defini-
tions and discussions of the doctrine, see McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested
Approach, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 694 (1956) ("Whatever its beginnings re-
crimination has tended to develop into a symmetrical formula whereby if
the petitioner and respondent are each independently guilty of grounds for
divorce, neither can obtain a divorce."); Beaner, The Doctrine of Recrim-
ination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 213 (1942) (An ex-
cellent and often quoted analysis of the history and application of the doc-
trine.); Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 377
(1937).
2 See Dwinnell v. Dwinnell, 165 Neb. 566, 86 N.W.2d 579 (1957); and Work-
man v. Workman, 164 Neb. 642, 83 N.W.2d 368 (1957), discussed at p. 436
below.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of recrimination has not only gained substantial
prominence in Anglo-American tribunals, but it is claimed that
its history can be traced to early Mosaic law,3 and that it also ap-
peared in Roman law.4 It is apparently not existent in the laws of
certain oriental countries,5 nor is it present in French law.6 In
Scotland, the doctrine was recognized at one time7 but was later
rejected.8
Although the basis for the present day application of the doc-
3 Deut. xxii, 13-19, which states that if man falsely accuses his wife of un-
chastity prior to their marriage and these allegations be proven to be false
before the elders of the city, the husband "may not put her away all his
days."
4 Sir William Scott, in Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep.
504 (1790), cites two Roman cases, Digest 24.3.39 ("Viro atque uxore in-
vicem accusantibus, causam repudii dedisse utrumque pronuntiatum est:
id ita accipi debet, ut ea lege, quam ambo contempserunt, neuter vindice-
tur: paria enim delicta mutua pensatione dissolvuntur.") and Digest 48.5.13.5
("Judex adulterii ante oculos habere debet et inquirere, an maritus pudice
vivens, mulieri quoque bonos mores colendi auctor fuerit. Periniquum enim
videtur esse ut pudicitiam vir ab uxore exigat, quam ipse non exhibeat.").
However, Beamer, 10 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 213, 216 (1942) feels that neither
of these cases shows, in fact, an application of the doctrine of recrimination.
He feels that the proper translation in the first case should be: "Since the
husband and wife each accuse the other, it has been found that both of them
have given cause for repudiation. This ought to be accepted thus: namely,
that neither should be punished by that law which both have broken. For
equal faults mutually compensate each other." (Note however, that Beamer
also points out that the case was not one for divorce, but was an action to
determine whether a husband is entitled to the right to refuse restitution of
full dowry because of the wife's misconduct, when he, himself, was guilty
of misconduct.) The statement in the second case, states Beamer, should be
translated as follows: "The judge of the adulterer ought to keep in mind
and to inquire as to whether the husband lived in decency and was an ex-
ample of good conduct for the distressed wife."
5 For example, neither Hindu nor Burmese law indicates the use of such
a doctrine. Strange, Hindu Law 47 (4th ed. 1864); 2 Dig. of Burmese Law
173 (1905).
6 Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 146, 161 Eng. Rep. 504, 506 (1790)
(which in a footnote stated: "This may be connected with the principle in
the French law, 'that adultery, committed by the husband, is not a ground of
divorce or separation on the part of the wife.' Pothier, vol. 3, p. 177."). Cf.
Bradway, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 377, 380 (1937).
7 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation § 341 (1891).
8 Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 75, 77 (21st ed. 1911).
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trine may be found in the ecclesiastical law of England,9 there its
use was originally limited to a plea of adultery in bar of a similar
plea of adultery, 0 and a plea of adultery in bar of a plea of cruelty."
In the ecclesiastical courts of England an allegation of cruelty would
not affect a plaintiff's cause of action founded on adultery, 2 and
there is little foundation for the application of the rule when both
parties alleged cruelty.13 The ecclesiastical courts were only vested
with power to grant separation decrees and annulments, 14 with only
Parliament having authority to grant absolute divorces. 15 Parlia-
ment seems to have gone both ways on the question of recrimina-
tion, in Major Campbell's Case'6 granting an absolute divorce not-
withstanding a recriminatory plea, but in Major Bland's Case17
denying a divorce on the basis of recrimination, despite a divorce
a mensa et thoro previously awarded by the ecclesiastical court.
The adoption of the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1857,18 establishing
the matrimonial courts for the award of both separation and abso-
9 Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. 747 (1819); Forster v.
Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504 (1790); Eldred v. Eldred, 2 Curt.
Ec. 376, 163 Eng. Rep. 445 (1840).
10 Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 292, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 751 (1819). There,
although the court applied the doctrine of recrimination, the statement was
made by Sir William Scott, that: "Taking this (application of the doctrine
of recrimination), as I think I am compelled to do, as the rule of law binding
upon the judgments of this Court, I cannot blind myself to the fact that
the modern course of life and manners does not furnish those corrections of
the mischiefs that may follow, which the canon law had anticipated in con-
nexion with its rule. There is no return to cohabitation, nor are any means
to be resorted to for the purpose of compelling it. In the state of separation,
whether authorized or merely conventional, which usually takes place, there
is certainly the increased danger of a spurious offspring, and, as the regu-
lations of property exist amongst us, the danger of separate debts, to the
great eventual injury of the husband and his legitimate family."
11 Watkyns v. Watkyns, 2 Atk. 96, 26 Eng. Rep. 460 (1740) is the generally
cited authority for this principle. However, it should be noted that the
Watkyns case was not an action for judicial separation, but for maintenance.
12 Eldred v. Eldred, 2 Curt. Ec. 376, 382, 163 Eng. Rep. 445, 447 (1840), in
which Sir Herbert Jenner stated the doctrine to be: "'... . that a wife cannot
plead cruelty as a bar to divorce for her violation of the marriage bed.' That
is no doubt the general rule, and founded upon reason and justice."
13 2 Bishop, Marriage Divorce and Separation §. 353 (1891). However, this
issue was never specifically before the courts.
14 Macqueen, Marriage, Divorce and Legitimacy 31 (2d ed. 1860).
15 Ibid.
16 Discussed id. at p. 92, and cited as Macq. H. of L. 591.
17 Discussed id. at p. 93, and cited as Macq. H. of L. 605.
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lute divorces,19 left the matter of the enforcement of the doctrine,
in the case of application for dissolution divorces, in the discretion
of the court.2
0
II. A COLLATERAL CONCEPT - COMPARATIVE RECTITUDE
Another approach to the problem of mutual guilt of the parties
is the theory of comparative rectitude, which has been defined as
"that power or discretion . . . to weigh the relative faults of the
parties and grant a divorce to the one least at fault, notwithstanding
the other has also been guilty of conduct which is ground for
divorce."'2 1 It is not the purpose nor within the scope of this paper
to consider the comparative rectitude concept, but, although it is
separate and distinct from the theory of recrimination, it is felt
useful to examine the doctrine briefly for a more complete under-
standing of the treatment by English and American courts of the
mutual guilt case. Some American courts today, in an effort to avoid
the evil results of the impasse of recrimination, have resorted to
weighing the misconduct of the parties and awarding a divorce to
the party less at fault.22 In other jurisdictions this is achieved by the
enactment of comparative rectitude statutes.23 Unfortunately, at
times this procedure has become more of a mathematical calcu-
lation than a weighing of equities.24 The comparative rectitude ap-
proach is the antithesis of the concept of the "pure and innocent
spouse," under which a petitioner's misconduct which would not be
a ground for divorce will preclude the award of a decree.25
III. RECRIMINATION IN NEBRASKA
A. THE STATUTE
In the State of Nebraska there is a statutory prescription for the
applicability of the doctrine of recrimination, the law reading as
follows: 26
18 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
39Id. §§ 2-6.
20 Id. § 31.
21 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 10.03 (2d ed. 1945).
22 Ibid.
23 Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 427 (2d ed. 1923).
24 For a defense of the doctrine of comparative rectitude, see Davis, Mutual
Misconduct in Arkansas Divorce, 3 Ark. L. Rev. 132 (1949).
25 Stiehr v. Stiehr, 145 Mich. 297, 108 N.W. 684 (1906).
26 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-304 (Reissue 1952).
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Divorce; collusion; misconduct of petitioner; effect. No divorce
shall be decreed in any case when it shall appear that the petition
or bill therefor was founded in or exhibited by collusion between
the parties, nor where the party complaining shall be guilty of
the same crime or misconduct charged against the respondent.
The legislative history of this enactment gives little insight into
the intent of the lawmakers in passing the statute. Two years after
its organization as a territory,27 Nebraska enacted a combination
collusion and recrimination statute as a part of its divorce code, its
provisions being identical to those in the present statute.28 The
Territorial lawmakers, either lacking in originality or desiring to
profit from the experience of another area, apparently copied the
bulk of the divorce code from that of Michigan. 29 This theory of
statutory plagiarism is suggested in view of the fact that not only
did most of the divorce code provisions under the Nebraska statute
appear in identical form to those of Michigan, but also the same
grammatical error was made in both.30 Apparently this statutory
chain can be traced back no farther than the Michigan law of 184231
- the prior Michigan recrimination law, which was far different
in its wording, being taken from the New York law.32 In later years,
Wyoming also adopted the same provision,33 probably taking it from
Nebraska because of their proximity. It is interesting to note that
through the years none of these three states has chosen to alter its
recrimination statute substantially. In Nebraska the law remains
intact as it was enacted in 1856.34 Michigan has made a very slight
change in its statutory provision, but its substance is the same,35
while in Wyoming there has been no modification of the provision.36
Before proceeding into the Nebraska cases, it should also be
noted that in the State of Nebraska the grounds for divorce are
adultery, physical incompetence at the time of the marriage,
27 16 Encyc. Brit. 182 (1955). The first Territorial Legislature met in 1855.
2 8 Neb. Sess. Laws 1855-65, 278; Code of Terr. of Neb., c. 52, § 9 (1856).
29 Mich. Rev. Stat. c. 84, § 10 (1846).
3 0 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 3227 (1857); and'Rev. Stat. of'Terr. of Neb., c.
52, § 6 (1866).
31 Mich. Rev. Stat. c. 84, § 1 (1846).
32 1 Mich. Terr. Laws 499.
33 Comp. Laws Wyo. (Terr. Laws), c. 44, § 7 (1876).
34 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-304 (Reissue 1952), quoted in text at n. 26
above.
35 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.90 (1937).
36 Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-5908 (1945).
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sentence of imprisonment for three years or more, abandonment,
habitual drunkenness, sentence of imprisonment for life,37 extreme
cruelty, desertion,38 and incurable insanity.
39
B. THE CASES
It is with this background in mind that the Nebraska Supreme
Court cases regarding recrimination should be examined. 40 In the
history of the State and the Territory, there have been ten cases in
which recrimination has been considered as an issue by the Court. It
should be noted, however, that there are numerous other cases in
which recrimination might have been an issue, but was not con-
sidered by the Court, despite pleadings and evidence which showed
mutual guilt.41 In two of the recrimination cases,42 the facts were
not sufficient to bring the doctrine of recrimination into play. The
other eight cases can be divided into four major groups, each group
indicating a trend in the thinking of the Court. The Supreme Court
of Nebraska, as will be shown by an examination of the cases, has
failed to demonstrate any degree of consistency in its analysis of
the doctrine of recrimination, or in its evaluation of the facts at
bar in the various cases. Not only has its thinking been erratic,
but it has failed to look at the statute existing in the State on the
matter of recrimination. No pretense has been made at either justi-
fying a possible deviation from the statutory provisions, or at de-
veloping a rationale consistent with such provisions - the Court
has simply ignored the presence of the statute. It is toward a
37 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-301 (Reissue 1952).
3 8 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-302 (Reissue 1952).
39 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-302.01 (Reissue 1952).
40 Because of the large number of cases in which a recriminatory situation
perhaps existed, the cases which are considered herein as "recrimination
cases" are restricted to those in which recrimination was specifically alleged
by one of the parties, or in which the doctrine of recrimination was con-
sidered by the courts. Of course, every case in which both parties enter
pleas of misconduct on the part of the other presents a potential recrimina-
tion problem.
41 See discussion in text under VI, A.
42 Judkins v. Judkins, 76 Neb. 213, 107 N.W. 254 (1906) (The trial court
denied a divorce to both parties on the basis of recrimination, and the Su-
preme Court reached the same result, but on the basis of lack of sufficient
evidence to award a divorce to either party); Stephens v. Stephens, 143 Neb.
711, 10 N.W.2d 620 (1943) (Although the court quoted copiously from the
Nebraska recrimination cases, it stated that the plaintiff had committed no
act which would preclude the award of a decree to her so recrimination
actually was not an issue.)
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careful analysis of the thinking of the Supreme Court of the State
that the existing cases are divided into the following categories:
1. The Comparative Rectitude Theory
The earliest Nebraska recrimination case, Walton v. Walton,43
went on appeal to the state Supreme Court in 1898. In that case, the
plaintiff wife based her action for divorce a vinculo matrimonii on
extreme cruelty practiced by the defendant; and the defendant
husband cross-petitioned for an absolute divorce on the basis of his
wife's cruelty and adultery, alleging that any misconduct of which
he might be guilty was the result of his wife's cruelty toward him.
The Court there affirmed an award of the trial court of an absolute
divorce to the plaintiff on the basis that: 44
... the punishment inflicted by him [the defendant] was out of all
proportion to her [the plaintiff's] offense and affords him nojustification.
The basic principles of the comparative rectitude doctrine have been
discussed above,45 and the statements of the Court in this case in-
dicate that at that early stage in the development of the law of
recrimination in the State there was a persuasive inclination toward
an acceptance of the comparative rectitude approach.4 This ten-
dency was short-lived, although a somewhat modified comparative
rectitude idea was later employed. In still later years the doctrine
was specifically repudiated.47
2. The Hybrid Comparative Rectitude-Recrimination Theory
This hybrid approach was achieved by grafting the comparison
of guilt characteristic of the comparative rectitude theory on the
recrimination prohibition against awarding an absolute divorce -
the result being an award of a divorce a mensa et thoro to the less
43 57 Neb. 102, 77 N.W. 392 (1898).
44 Id. at 120.
45 See text, Section II, infra.
46 There is an indication in the opinion of this case that the wife's mis-
conduct was not that which could be a ground for divorce. However, the
Court proceeded to say that it was not material whether or not the wife's
conduct would be a ground for divorce because her husband's improper acts
were so patently disproportionate to any possible misconduct on her part.
47 Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W. 139, 140 (1935). There the
court stated, citing Peyton v. Peyton, 97 Neb. 663, 151 N.W. 150 (1915): "This
court has held, however, that if the conduct of both parties to a divorce
action has been such as to furnish grounds for a divorce, neither is entitled
thereto although the conduct of one has been grossly more culpable than
the other."
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guilty party in the divorce situation. This concept was manifested
in the following two ways:
a. The Blameless Party Approach
Rather than following the usual application of the doctrine of
recrimination only to cases where the misconduct charged against
both parties would be ground for divorce,48 in 1904, the Nebraska
Court, in McKnight v. McKnight,49 chose to utilize the equitable
clean hands doctrine in its strictest sense, by requiring that a party
be absolutely blameless to be eligible for an absolute divorce.50
Parties who were not "blameless," but whose guilt would not con-
stitute a ground for divorce might be awarded a divorce a mensa et
thoro. The Court used this language in explaining its theory: 51
• . . the true rule which should govern the courts in the exercise
of their discretion in this respect is this, that to entitle to a decree
for absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony, the applicant
must be the innocent party-one who has faithfully discharged
the obligations of the marriage relation, and seeks relief because
really aggrieved or injured by the misconduct of the other; and,
on the other hand, where there are circumstances showing a dis-
regard of those obligations, though not carried to such a degree
as to constitute itself a ground for divorce, the decree should be
only for a divorce from bed and board. To obtain a release a
vinculo matrimonii, the applicant must be without reproach, and
however guilty the defendant, if the applicant is chargeable either
with similar guilt, or of an offense to which the law attaches similar
consequences, the relief must be denied; and if the applicant, though
not thus guilty, is still not blameless, the relief must be limited to
a divorce a mensa et thoro.
b. The Social Welfare Approach
On occasion, the Nebraska Supreme Court has nearly repeated
the comparative rectitude concept shown in Walton v. Walton,
52
but has muffled this strong stand by granting only a divorce a mensa
et thoro rather than a divorce a vinculo matrimonii in such cases.
In Goings v. Goings,53 for example, the court recognized the fact
that:
48 See note 1 supra.
49 5 Neb. Unof. 260, 98 N.W. 62 (1904).
50 It should be noted, however, that in the McKnight case an absolute
divorce was granted to the plaintiff wife, the Court feeling that Mrs.
McKnight's conduct had been spotless in all respects.
51 5 Neb. Unof. 260, 267, 98 N.W. 62 (1904) quoting from Conant v. Conant,
10 Cal. 249, 70 Am. Dec. 717 (1858).
52 57 Neb. 102, 77 N.W. 392 (1898).
53 90 Neb. 148, 150, 133 N.W. 199, 200 (1911).
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• .. a worse condition of domestic discord, and possibly of crime,
could hardly be presented on paper. . . . Acts of lasciviousness,
cruelty and inhumanity have been perpetrated by each of the
parties toward the other...
but yet went on to grant a divorce a mensa et thoro. It relied upon
the McKnight case for authority, but obviously did not follow the
strict reasoning in that decision. Interestingly enough, the Court
explained in elaborate detail why it could not grant an absolute
divorce to either party, but failed to explain the award of the di-
vorce from bed and board. Such an explanation was given, how-
ever, in Forburger v. Forburger,54 in which the fact situation closely
paralleled that in the Goings case. Again the court carefully ex-
plained that neither- party was entitled to an absolute divorce,
but proceeded to grant a divorce a mensa et thoro on the basis that
if the parties could not live together with any degree of happiness
they should be "permitted to live apart."
3. The Traditional View
In still other cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted
what might be called the "traditional view" toward the doctrine
of recrimination, i.e., the application of the doctrine in all cases
showing misconduct which would be a ground for divorce on the
part of both parties. This title should perhaps be changed to "the
traditional American view" inasmuch as the ecclesiastical courts of
England were less generous with their application of the doctrine
of recrimination than were their successors in the United States.
The case of Wilson v. Wilson 5 is the most prominent case of
this type. In that case the plaintiff husband brought his action for
divorce against his wife on the basis of her adultery, and the de-
fendant wife cross-petitioned on the basis of her husband's cruelty.
The trial court awarded a divorce to the plaintiff, but the Supreme
Court reversed and ordered that the action be dismissed, charging
that a decree could not be awarded in the recriminatory situation.
The Court relied heavily upon earlier American cases and upon
Bishop for authority, concluding its statement of the law with the
somewhat speculative remark that: 5
The doctrine here stated is the acknowledged rule in nearly, if,
not quite, all the states of the Union.
Nowhere in the opinion was there any reference to the provisions
of the Nebraska statute regarding recrimination, nor was there
any acknowledgment of the existence of such a law. A similar
view was taken in Peyton v. Peyton 7 in which the plaintiff alleged
54 122 Neb. 705, 241 N.W. 279 (1932).
55 89 Neb. 749, 132 N.W. 401 (1911).
56 Id. at 757.
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extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant and the defendant
countered with allegations of adultery and habitual drunkenness
on the part of the plaintiff. There the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the lower court dismissing the action. There was no
discussion of the law involved.
4. The Statutory Approach
The cases in this group are those in which the decisions con-
formed to the statutory provisions in their strictest sense. In Stud-
ley v. Studley,5 8 for example, both the plaintiff's petition and de-
fendant's answer pleaded the fact that the other party had been
convicted of a felony and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary
exceeding three years. The trial court dismissed the action, and
the Supreme Court affirmed, on the basis that neither party could
complain of the misconduct of the other when both of their arrests
and convictions arose out of a robbery in which they participated
together.59 And in Egbert v. Egbert,60 which, incidentally, is the
first case in which the Supreme Court alluded to the recrimination
statute, the Court reversed the award of the trial court and dis-
missed the action. There both parties had alleged extreme cruelty,
and the Supreme Court held that this was within the terms of the
statutory provisions regarding recrimination.6 1
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
So that the Nebraska statute and decisions may be viewed in
the light of the law in other jurisdictions, it is deemed desirable
to take a brief look at the statutes and cases of other areas.
57 97 Neb. 663, 151 N.W. 150 (1915).
58 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W. 139 (1935).
59Despite the fact of the jointly committed felony, the court based its
decision on a denial of a decree of divorce under the doctrine of recrimina-
tion, and did not consider the element of collusion. In addition, there was
an interesting point of law with regard to the sentences that the Studleys
were serving. Mrs. Studley had received a sentence of 1-10 years, but only
served 18 months of that time. She claimed, therefore, that her husband
could not invoke a recriminatory defense inasmuch as her term of imprison-
ment did not exceed the three-year limit provided in § 42-301 Neb. Rev.
Stat. (Reissue 1952). The court held, however, that in the case of an inde-
terminate sentence, the maximum limit of the sentence would govern.
60 149 Neb. 227, 30 N.W.2d 669 (1948).
61 Although in the Egbert case the grounds for divorce alleged by the
parties were the same, and the Court relied upon the statutory provisions
in denying a divorce on the basis of recrimination, it is interesting to note
that the Court wrote the following syllabus point for the case: "Upon an
application for a divorce where both parties are found guilty of any of the
enumerated offenses for which a divorce may be granted, the court should
dismiss the bill." (Emphasis supplied.)
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A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Vernier 62 states that thirty-two jurisdictions have recrimination
statutes, recrimination being an absolute defense in twenty-nine of
these jurisdictions. In the remaining three, Kansas, Oklahoma and
Minnesota, the application of the doctrine rests in the discretion of
the court. 63 According to Vernier's analysis, the statutes regarding
recrimination may be grouped as follows: (1) adultery v. adultery
-fifteen jurisdictions; 6 4 (2) any cause v. any cause-six jurisdic-
tions; 65 (3) any cause v. same crime or misconduct-three juris-
dictions; 66 (4) any cause v. adultery-three jurisdictions;6 7  (5)
adultery v. any cause-one jurisdiction;6 (6) any cause v. adultery
or like cause-one jurisdiction;69 (7) any cause v. cause of equal
wrong-two jurisdictions; 70  (8) desertion, cruelty, adultery, in-
toxication v. like conduct-one jurisdiction.7 1
The Georgia statute72 is the only one which approximates those
of Nebraska, Michigan and Wyoming in the use of the term "like
misconduct," the doctrine of recrimination applying in cases of
adultery, cruel treatment, desertion or intoxication.7 3 These, how-
ever, are not the only grounds for divorce in that state.74 In Ken-
tucky, the law provides that a wife may be granted a divorce
under certain conditions "if not in like fault," and also provides
62 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 78 (1932).
03 For a discussion of cases arising under the discretionary statutes, see
text infra IV, B, 4.
64 Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Fla., Ill., Ind., Me., Minn., Mo., N.J., N.Y., Ore., Pa.,
Tenn., Tex.
65 Cal., Colo., Idaho, Mont., N.D., S.D.
66 Mich., Neb., Wyo.
67 Del., W. Va., Wis.
6 8 Hawaii.
69 Ark.
70 Kan., Okla.
71 Ga.
72 Ga. Code Ann. § 30-109 (1952).
73Ibid. and Ga. Code Ann. § 30-102 (1952).
74 Incestuous marriage; mental incapacity at the time of marriage; im-
potency at the time of marriage; force, menace, duress or fraud in obtaining
the marriage; pregnancy of the wife at the time of the marriage by someone
other than her husband; conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude
and imprisonment therefor for two years or longer; incurable insanity and
confinement therefor for three years are also grounds for an absolute
divorce in Georgia. However, since some of these do not involve matters of
offenses against the marriage, quaere as to whether they would be proper
subjects of recrimination even if the statute were to cover them.
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that a husband may be granted a divorce under slightly different
conditions "if not in like fault."7 5
A number of western states have rather precisely worded re-
crimination statutes. Both California and Montana, for example,
have statutes providing that divorces shall be denied upon a show-
ing of recrimination," and then go on to define exactly what is
meant by the term "recrimination." 77 Similarly, under the Colo-
rado statute78 it is provided that:
... if upon the trial of such action both parties shall be found
guilty of any one or more of the causes of divorce, then a divorce
shall not be granted to either of said parties.
In Iowa, as in other states, there is no specific recrimination stat-
ute, but the courts nevertheless read the doctrine of recrimination
into the body of law by virtue of the general equitable powers
granted by statutory provisions.79
B. THE CASES
1. The American Majority View
Like Nebraska, most of the states having recrimination statutes
do not look strictly to the statute for the proper method of applying
the doctrine of recrimination. In Illinois, for example, the statute
75 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.020 (1955). A comment in 41 Ky. L. J. 330 (1953),
entitled, Does Recrimination Remain in Kentucky?, discusses the case of
Shofner v. Shofner, 310 Ky. 869, 222 S.W.2d 933 (1949), which seemingly
rejected the doctrine of recrimination. The author expresses the theory
that this unusual decision was reached because of the indifference of the
trial court, and the work load of the upper court. He then goes on to cite
a later case, Hartstern v. Hartstern, 311 Ky. 564, 224 S.W.2d 447 (1949),
which emphatically reaffirmed the doctrine of recrimination.
76 Cal. Civ. Code § 111 (1949); Rev. Codes of Mont. § 21-118 (Supp. 1955).
77Both Cal. Civ. Code § 122 (1949) and Rev. Codes of Mont. § 21-128
(Supp. 1955) provide: "Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any
cause of divorce against the plaintiff, in bar of the plaintiff's cause of
divorce."
78 Colo. Rev. Stats. § 46-1-4 (1953).
79 Iowa Code Ann. § 598.2 (1950) provides: "An action for a divorce shall
be by equitable proceedings. . . ." The Iowa courts have utilized these
general equitable powers as a means for adopting the doctrine of recrimina-
tion. See Paulsen v. Paulsen, 243 Iowa 51, 50 N.W. 2d 567 (1951).
80 Ill. Ann. Stats. c. 40, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
81266 Ill. App. 277 (1931). The court there stated, at 300: "The law of this
state gives several reasons, each one of which it declares should be sufficient
to sunder the marriage bond. A husband who breaks most of these and con-
tinues to break them through the years, cannot be said to come into court
with clean hands. A court of equity is a court of conscience. Its arm is not
shortened in such a case. A decree of divorce to this husband on these facts
would offend the conscience and the sense of justice."
DOCTRINE OF RECRIMINATION
provides that the doctrine shall be applied in the adultery v. adult-
ery situation. 0 However, the Illinois courts have gone far beyond
this restriction and now have a full doctrine of recrimination. In
Grady v. Grady81 the Illinois Appellate Court stated that it felt
that it was within the "discretion" of the court to bar the award of
a divorce in cases of mutual guilt where the grounds were miscon-
duct other than adultery. The interesting factor is that in support-
ing this argument it relied upon the English Matrimonial Causes
Act for authority, but reached a considerably different result than
had most of the English courts under that act. The Court also ig-
nored the fact that discretion is vested in the English matrimonial
courts by the specific terms of the statute, while the Illinois statute
contained no such provision .8 2 And in Martin v. Martin3 the Ap-
pellate Court dismissed both the plaintiff's petition and the de-
fendant's cross-petition on the basis that ". . . persons who are in
pari delicto may not be granted divorce .... 8 4 Probably one of the
best statements of the application of the doctrine of recrimination
by the Illinois courts is found in Levy v. Levy,85 which carefully
82 111. Ann. Stats. c. 40, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1956) provides: "If it shall appear,
to the satisfaction of the court ... that both parties have been guilty of
adultery, when adultery is the ground of complaint, then no divorce shall
be decreed."
83 327 Ill. App. 552, 64 N.E.2d 379 (1946).
84 Id. at 552.
85 388 Ill. 179, 185, 57 N.E.2d 366, reversing 320 Ill. App. 608, 51 N.E.2d 829
(1944). There the Illinois Supreme Court stated: "Under such circum-
stances, the rule long ago announced in Duberstein v. Duberstein, 171 Ill.
133, is clearly applicable here. As in that case, the defendant asserted
recrimination in defense of plaintiff's charges and thus we repeat: 'Divorce
is a remedy provided for an innocent party* * *; so that, when each party
has committed a cause for divorce, the causes being of the same statutory
character, neither can complain of the other. Here, it cannot be said, in view
of the testimony already quoted, that the appellee is an innocent party.
* * * In discussing this subject Mr. Bishop in his work on Marriage, Divorce
and Separation, says: "There is a rule which forbids redress to one for an
injury done him by another if himself in the wrong about the same thing
whereof he complains." This doctrine is applicable in the divorce law. * * *
It is peculiarly applicable to the facts of this case. * * * the parties here are
in pari delicto and therefore must be left to themselves.' The same prin-
ciple was reaffirmed in Garrett v. Garrett, 252 Ill. 318, wherein the court
said: 'It is the settled law that divorce is a remedy provided only for an
innocent party, and when each party has cause for divorce against the other
of the same statutory character neither can be granted a divorce; that a
defendant charged with extreme and repeated cruelty may show in defense
that the complainant was equally cruel' The defense of recrimination thus
bars a divorce to plaintiff upon the present record." Apparently by using
the term "the same statutory character" the court meant conduct which
would be grounds for divorce.
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outlined the history of the doctrine in that state. The court there
made it amply clear that the justification for the utilization of the
principle of recrimination was to be found in the clean hands doc-
trine in equity. Elston v. Elston86 gives much of the same indica-
tion, relying heavily on the Levy case for authority.
The absence of statutes defining recrimination or the bounds
of its application does not act as a deterrent in the application of
the principle. Maryland, for example, has no recrimination statute,
but the courts have emphatically applied the doctrine.8 7 And in
Massachusetts a similar course has been followed, the court stating
in Reddington v. Reddington,88 for example:
After the statutes of this Commonwealth provided for judicial
divorces, this court assumed, and the Legislature has long ac-
quiesced in the assumption, that the doctrine of recrimination,
though not mentioned in the statutes, had been adopted by impli-
cation.
In the case of Blankenship v. Blankenship,s9 the Nevada Supreme
Court applied the doctrine of recrimination, and specifically re-
nounced comparative rectitude as a solution to the mutual guilt
problem in divorce. There the court states: 90
The rule of recrimination is, in our opinion, applicable to the
case and operates as a bar to a decree of divorce.... Where each
of the spouses has been guilty of misconduct which is cause for
divorce, neither is entitled to this remedy. This rule is established
by the decided weight of American authority [citing a long line of
American cases] .... The rule rests upon the equitable principle
that one who invokes the aid of a court must come into it with clean
hands.
86 344 Ill. App. 233, 100 N.E.2d 635 (1951) (extreme cruelty v. extreme
cruelty, adultery, bigamy).
87 See Appeltofft v. Appeltofft, 147 Md. 603, 128 Atl. 273 (1925); Geisselman
v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 Atl. 185 (1919); Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141,
93 Atl. 400, L.R.A. 1915E, 972 Ann. Cas. 1917A, 175; Fisher v. Fisher, 93 Md.
298, 48 Atl. 833 (1901).
88 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E.2d 775 (1945). There the court's statement was
reminiscent of the philosophies of Lord Stowell and Chancellor Walworth
(See 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation § 343 (1891) in which he
quotes Lord Stowell as saying that guilty spouses can "find sources of
mutual forgiveness in the humiliation of mutual guilt" and Chancellor Wal-
worth as saying that they are "suitable and proper companions."). The
Massachusetts Court stated, at p. 763: "The fact that a marriage has proved
so unsuccessful that both spouses have broken their vows by giving cause
for divorce, has the effect of riveting the legal bond and making it indis-
soluble except by death."
89 51 Nev. 356, 276 Pac. 9, 63 A.L.R. 1127 (1929).
90 Id. at 359.
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2. The Michigan Cases
Because of its identical statute, it appears worthwhile to exam-
ine the course of the cases in Michigan with particular care. In
that state the Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Nebraska,
has not restricted its application of the doctrine of recrimination to
those cases where both parties claim the identical ground for di-
vorce. In Stiehr v. Stiehr,91 for example, the plaintiff sought a di-
vorce on the basis of the defendant's cruelty, and the defendant
alleged the adultery of the plaintiff as a recriminatory defense. The
court in that case, and in other similar cases, 92 based its application
of the doctrine of recrimination on the equitable theory of clean
hands. Even in the cases which clearly come within the terms of
the statute, i.e., those in which both parties allege misconduct which
would constitute the same ground for divorce, the clean hands con-
cept is still expressed. Mr. Justice Dooley, in Hoff v. Hoff, 93 stated:
And it is as true of divorce cases as any others, that a party
must come into a court of equity with clean hands. Divorce laws
are made to give relief to the innocent, not the guilty.
This view is echoed in a number of other cases.9 4 In fact, like the
Nebraska Court in McKnight v. McKnight,95 the Michigan Court on
occasion apparently has not concerned itself with whether or not
the misconduct alleged was necessarily of the type that would be
sufficient to support a cause of action for divorce.96
A view slightly different in approach, but not in result, was
taken in a group of cases in which the Michigan Court held that
no decree could be awarded where the deterioration of the marriage
had been through the mutual fault and neglect of both parties.97
The improbability of a reconciliation was deemed not to be a proper
consideration in a mutual guilt situation,98 although in Weiss v.
91 145 Mich. 297, 108 N.W. 684 (1906).
92 Demorest v. Demorest, 259 Mich. 156, 242 N.W. 873 (1932); Melinn v.
Melinn, 329 Mich. 96, 44 N.W.2d 886 (1951).
93 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
9 4Bennett v. Bennett, 336 Mich. 133, 57 N.W.2d 323 (1953); Hoffmann v.
Hoffmann, 329 Mich. 486, 45 N.W.2d 366 (1951); Bradford v. Bradford, 329
Mich. 328, 45 N.W.2d 305 (1951); Kanka v. Kanka, 318 Mich. 109, 27 N.W.2d
602 (1947); Gill v. Gill, 213 Mich. 384, 181 N.W. 996 (1921); Root v. Root, 164
Mich. 638, 130 N.W. 194, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 837 (1911).
9 5 McKnight v. McKnight, 5 Neb. Unof. 260, 98 N.W. 62 (1904).
9 6Weiss v. Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N.W. 587 (1913).
97 Juda v. Juda, 327 Mich. 321, 41 N.W.2d 883 (1950); Kuhfal v. Kuhfal, 318
Mich. 105, 27 N.W.2d 512 (1947); Stafford v. Stafford, 53 Mich. 522, 19 N.W.
201 (1884).
98 McGorkey v. McGorkey, 366 Micl 698, 58 N.W.2d 818 (1953).
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Weiss,99 the Court noted, in awarding a divorce to the defendant
wife, that:
It is manifest, so far as human foresight can discern, that the
enmity and bitterness which has developed precludes possibility of
reconciliation.
In yet another case the duty to reconcile and the fact that the par-
ties had small children were factors in the Court's preservation of
the marriage. 10 0 As to the treatment of other factors in recrim-
ination cases, the Michigan Court has held that condoned offenses
against the marriage are not bars to subsequent actions for di-
vorce; 1° 1 that the adultery of the plaintiff during the pendency of
the action would invoke the doctrine of recrimination;102 and even
though a plaintiff's misconduct during the period of the interlocu-
tory decree was not discovered until after the decree had become
final, the decree would be set aside. 0 3 However, a plaintiff's en-
gagement during the pendency of a divorce action would not de-
feat such action, so long as there was no showing of moral deprav-
ity on her part.
10 4
The doctrine of comparative rectitude has been adopted to an
extent by the Michigan Court. In Weiss v. Weiss, 05 for example,
the court said:
It is a salutary and well-recognized elementary rule of equity
jurisprudence that one seeking aid from a court of chancery must
come with clean hands, and, if not, the court will decline to act,
leaving the parties where it finds them. That rule, as applied to
divorce, means that it is a remedy provided only for the innocent
and injured party, and, if the evidence discloses that both have
shown ground for divorce, neither is entitled to it. It must be con-
ceded, however, that there is a growing tendency in divorce cases
to at all times relax that rule, on grounds of public policy or the
peculiar exigencies of the special case under consideration, and
adopt one of comparative rectitude or turpitude. This record, taken
99 174 Mich. 431, 140 N.W. 587 (1913).
100 Garb v. Garb, 328 Mich. 305, 43 N.W.2d 863 (1950).
10 1 Kinek v. Kinek, 331 Mich. 54, 49 N.W.2d 58 (1951); Wieland v. Wieland,
227 Mich. 395, 198 N.W. 921 (1924).
10 2 Arix v. Arix, 212 Mich. 438, 180 N.W. 463 (1920).
103 Linn v. Linn, 341 Mich. 668, 69 N.W.2d 147 (1955). There the plaintiff
became pregnant during the period of the interlocutory decree, the father
of the child being one other than the defendant. Despite the fact that upon
the decree's becoming final the plaintiff married the father of the child,
the Michigan Court set aside the divorce decree on the basis that it was
obtained by fraud.
104 Curtis v. Curtis, 330 Mich. 63, 46 N.W.2d 460 (1951).
105 174 Mich. 431, 432, 140 N.W. 587, 589 (1913).
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as a whole, breathes the suggestion that defendant's divorce comes
more logically under the rule of comparison.
In other cases the Michigan Court specifically denied the idea that
the Weiss case utilized the doctrine of comparative rectitude,105
but in later cases comparisons of guilt of the parties were made,
and divorces were awarded to the less guilty parties.10 7
3. The Wyoming Cases
No cases have arisen under the Wyoming recrimination statute.
Perhaps this is explainable in part by the fact that Wyoming has a
"living apart" divorce statute,08 so parties who have both broken
their marriage vows may take this somewhat easier course in
achieving a termination of the marriage.
4. The English View
Since the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act,10 9 the tend-
ency in the English courts has been to gradually fail to apply the
recrimination theory in mutual guilt cases.110 Under the present
Matrimonial Causes Act, the grounds for divorce are adultery,
cruelty, incurable insanity, and desertion,"' and in practice the
only offense necessitating a specific plea for the exercise of the
judicial discretion to grant a.decree in a mutual guilt case is that
of adultery.112 The procedure has been developed whereby at the
time a petitioner files his action, he must also file a full statement
of the facts regarding his own adultery. Unlike the situation in
the courts in the United States, this "confession" does not necessarily
operate to hinder the wrongdoing plaintiff's cause. Latey"s cites
106 Vardon v. Vardon., 266 Mich. 341, 253 N.W. 320 (1934); Hatfield v. Hat-
field, 213 Mich. 368, 181 N.W. 968 (1921).
-
07 Boter v. Boter, 338 Mich. 187, 61 N.W.2d 64 (1953); Trombley v. Tromb-
ley, 313 Mich. 80, 20 N.W.2d 818 (1945).
108 Wyo. Comp. Stats. § 3-5906 (1945). For a discussion on living apart
statutes see McCurdy, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 685 (1956).
109 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (1857).
110 Latey, Divorce § 302 (14th ed. 1952).
["Matrimonial Causes Act, Geo. 6, c. 57, § 1 (1950).
112 Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 497 (3d ed. 1946).
313 Latey, Divorce § 302 (14th ed. 1952). He cites Wilkinson v. Wilkinson
and Seymour, 37 T.L.R. 835 (1921) (where the plaintiff husband had com-
mitted adultery after becoming aware of his wife's adultery, and indicated
a desire to marry the woman with whom he had engaged in the illicit
acts); Pointon v. Pointon and Sutton, 38 T.L.R. 848 (1922) (where the plain-
tiff husband had lived in a state of adultery with his housekeeper for thirty
years); Grayson v. Grayson, 43 T.L.R. 225 (1927) (where the plaintiff hus-
band expressed a desire to marry the woman with whom he was living).
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a number of instances in which the English courts have granted di-
vorces to errant plaintiffs, particularly where there were indica-
tions that the adulterer would subsequently marry the person with
whom he or she had been having the illicit relationship. There
seem to be a number of reasons for this rather liberal view taken
by the English courts. In Blunt v. Blunt,114 a case in which each
party alleged adultery on the part of the other, the trial court
awarded a divorce to both parties, and the Court of Appeal re-
versed the decision, awarding a divorce to the plaintiff wife. On
appeal to the House of Lords, the judgment of the trial court was
reinstated, Viscount Simon, L. C., explaining the holding in this
manner: 115
it appears to me that cases may not infrequently arise in
which each party, while proving the case for his or her petition,
has been guilty of such conduct as by the terms of the statute
entitles the court to dismiss the petition, where injustice may be
done if discretion is exercised in favour of one of the parties only.
There is no reason in principle why, where both sides are in mercy,
if the judge decides to exercise his discretion, he should not exercise
it in favour of both parties and pronounce the decree without
drawing a distinction between them. If, for example, the blame for
the breakdown of the marriage must be equally shared and the
circumstances are such as do not justify a judicial preference for
one party as compared with the other, serious injustice may be
done if a decree of divorce is pronounced in favour of one party
while the petition of the other party is dismissed.
It is significant that in the Blunt case there was no question as to
whether or not a divorce should be awarded-the only question was
to whom it should be granted.
5. The American Minority View
In the American jurisdictions, a few of the courts have also
become considerably more liberal in their treatment of the mutual
guilt problem. The states which have discretionary statutes are
utilizing them to award divorces where there is evidence of guilt
on the part of both parties. In Kansas, despite a previous holding
to the contrary," 6 the Supreme Court held that: -17
• where both parties are in equal wrong the court may, in its
discretion, grant or deny the divorce.
114 A.C. 517, All E.R. 76 (1943).
.15 Id. at 81.
116 Day v. Day, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974, 6 Ann. Cas. 169 (1905).
117 Lassen v. Lassen, 134 Kan. 436, 7 P.2d 120 (1932).
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And in Oklahoma the Court stated: 118
Under ... our statute, the trial court is given discretion in the
granting or refusal to grant a divorce when it appears that the
parties are equally at fault, and the judgment of the trial court
in such a case will not be set aside by this court on appeal in the
absence of a showing that the said court abused its sound dis-
cretion.
In other jurisdictions as well, the courts have seized upon the op-
portunity to rid themselves of the doctrine of recrimination, at
least as far as its mandatory application, even at the expense of
overruling large groups of cases or of contravening existing statutes.
In Pavietich v. Pavletich1"9 the New Mexico court overruled its
strongest previous recrimination case12 0 on the basis that a divorce
should be granted in a mutual guilt situation when there is evidence
that the parties are irreconcilable. A similar holding was shown in
the California case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,1 21 which overruled the
previous "landmark" case of Conant v. Conant12 2 despite the statute
making recrimination a mandatory bar to divorce.12 3 In the State of
Washington, as early as 1915 the courts began rejecting the doctrine
of recrimination. In Schirmer v. Schirmer124 the Supreme Court
of Washington affirmed an award of a divorce to both parties upon
a showing of cruelty on the part of both. The federal courts have
also rejected the mandatory application of the doctrine of recrim-
ination. In Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff 125 the Federal District Court
for the District of Columbia, in citing an earlier similar decision,12 6
favored the "liberalizing" of recrimination statutes and the inter-
pretation thereof to permit the dissolution of marriages which "had
ceased to exist in fact." And in Burch v. Burch,127 the Third Circuit,
118 Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 295 Pac. 219 (1931).
119 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946). This case, however, was not one in
which the question of recrimination was strictly at issue.
120 Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 50 P.2d 264, 101 A.L.R. 635 (1935).
12139 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952). A note in 27 So. Calif. L. Rev.
219 (1954) discusses the DeBurgh decision, the author's conclusion being
that while the holding may be an assumption of legislative function by
the judiciary, it should be "praised as accomplishing a sociologically valid
purpose."
122 10 Cal. 249, 70 Am. Dec. 717 (1858).
123 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 111, 122 (1949). § 111 provides: "Divorces must
be denied upon showing . . .recrimination."
124 84 Wash. 1, 145 Pac. 981 (1915).
125 144 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
126 Parks v. Parks, 116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
127 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
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in a case of incompatibility 128 v. cruelty, refused to apply the doc-
trine of recrimination and granted a divorce to both parties.
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE
AND THE CASES
A. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Aside from any consideration of the merits or faults of the
doctrine of recrimination, 129 the courts and legislatures in this
country have failed to apply the doctrine consistently. As Vernier
stated: 130
An examination of the statutes existing in the ... Americanjurisdiction is not calculated to give comfort to anyone who believes
in the superiority of the written over the unwritten law. The sta-
tutes of a majority of these thirty-two jurisdictions, if read literally,
are inconsistent with the theory of recrimination.
The point that Vernier is making is that if the doctrine of recrim-
ination is interpreted as one under which the guilt of a party will
preclude his release from the marital bond, then the statutes which
restrict the application of the doctrine to certain given situations
fail to live up to the avowed principles of recrimination. He might
have gone one step farther and shown that despite the existence
of specific statutory provisions, and despite the fact that in most
jurisdictions the powers of the courts handling matters of divorce
are restricted to those powers specifically granted by statute,'3'
a great many jurisdictions have extended the applicability of the
doctrine of recrimination far beyond its statutory bounds. 3 2 Be-
cause of the course its Supreme Court has taken, Nebraska is a
typical example of this position. The Nebraska recrimination stat-
ute has, since its adoption, contained the provision that a divorce
should be denied "where the party complaining shall be guilty of
the same crime or misconduct' 33 charged against the respondent.' 3 4
128 According to the Burch case, the Virgin Islands was the first American
jurisdiction to adopt incompatibility as a ground for divorce (Code of Laws
of the Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John, t. III, c. 44, § 7, subdiv.
8th), but that later New Mexico (N.M. Stats. § 25-701 [19411) and Alaska(Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 56-5-7 [1949]) also enacted similar provisions.
129 For an evaluation of the doctrine, see text, infra V, B, I.
130 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 78 (1932).
'3' Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 196 (2d ed. 1923).
132 See text, infra, IV, B, I.
'33 Emphasis supplied by author.
'34 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-304 (Reissue 1952).
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The following has long been the rule in Nebraska with regard to
divorce actions: 18 5
... the courts, either of law or equity, possess no powers except
such as are conferred by statute; and ... to justify any act
or proceeding in a case of divorce, whether it be such as pertains
to the ground or cause of action itself, to the process, pleadings
or practice in it, or to the mode of enforcing the judgment or decree,
authority therefor must be found in the statute, and cannot be
looked for elsewhere or otherwise asserted or exercised.
Despite this rule, in hearing the recrimination appeals that came
before it, the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to even attempt to
interpret the recrimination statute until only recently, even though
that statute had been in existence since 1856. Instead the Court
looked to Bishop for his interpretations of the common law concept
of recrimination, 36 and to cases from Wisconsin, 37 Missouri,138
New Jersey 3 9 and Rhode Island,140 for interpretations of the statutes
of those jurisdictions, which differed substantially from the Ne-
braska law. There was no careful examination of the legislative
history of the statute, nor an examination of the cases from the
jurisdiction that had identical statutory provisions. The result of
this haphazard jurisprudence was the decision in the Wilson case' 4'
-and once the Court had handed down that decision, it furnished
the dubious precedent for other cases in the State. The Wilson
decision in effect blanketed all mutual guilt divorce cases in the
state with the doctrine of recrimination, ignoring the fact that the
statute specifically provided that the doctrine should be applied
in cases of the "same crime or misconduct."' 42
135 Cizek v. Cizek, 69 Neb. 800, 99 N.W. 28, on reh'g from 69 Neb. 797
(1904); Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb. 288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921). Both of
these cases refer to an earlier Wisconsin decision, Barker v. Dayton, 28
Wis. 367, 378.
136 Wilson v. Wilson, 89 Neb. 749, 132 N.W. 401 (1911).
137 Pease v. Pease, 72 Wis. 136, 39 N.W. 133 (1888).
138 Nagel v. Nagel, 12 Mo. 53 (1848).
139 Reading v. Reading, 5 Atl. 721 (N.J. Chan. 1886).
140 Church v. Church, 16 R.I. 667, 19 Atl. 224 (1890).
14189 Neb. 749, 132 N.W. 401 (1911).
142 It is not without possibility that in the Wilson case a careful interpreta-
tion of the statute would have had the same result as the random excursion
into the case law of other jurisdictions. Tiffany (in his Handbook on the
Law of Persons and Domestic Relations § 108 [18961 ), for example, sug-
gests that the wording of the statute could be construed to mean any crime
or misconduct which would be a ground for divorce. It seems logical, how-
ever, that if the court had been making a concerted effort to understand
the wording of the law it would have stated its beliefs as to the meaning
of these very specific words-instead it failed to even acknowledge the
existence of the statute.
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Once the courts deviate from the exact statutory wording, they
seem to have little difficulty in adapting the doctrine of recrimina-
tion to the particular situation at bar-a policy which accounts for
a great deal of inconsistency in the administration of the divorce
laws of this country. In Nebraska, for example, one month after
the release of the opinion in the Wilson case-the case which is
considered the landmark recrimination case in the State-the Court
issued the opinion in Goings v. Goings,143 which was the quasi com-
parative rectitude decision. The composition of the bench was the
same in both cases, and both opinions were by Mr. Chief Justice
Reese. This assumption by the courts of legislative tasks in extend-
ing the doctrine of recrimination beyond its statutory definitions
is, in large part, responsible for the inconsistent decisions, not only
in Nebraska, but in other jurisdictions as well.
In addition, the courts become so involved in the job of "law
making" in the field of recrimination that they often cut out from
under themselves the very ground upon which they are standing.
For example, the purists would say that recrimination is a doctrine
to be applied to ALL mutual guilt divorce cases meeting the re-
quirement of statutory grounds for divorce-yet this was not so
in the English ecclesiastical courts,144 upon whose authority the
American courts claim to be dependent. And, as the Nebraska
Court did in Goings v. Goings145 and Forburger v. Forburger,46
when the courts award a divorce a mensa et thoro as a sort of con-
solation prize to the less guilty spouse, but deny an absolute di-
vorce on the basis of recrimination, they overlook the fact that
originally the doctrine of recrimination was applicable principally
to separation decrees. 47 Thus, in purporting to apply the common
law rule, the courts manage to enforce it where it had not been
consistently applied under the English law, and fail to apply the
doctrine in the area of its origin.
B. THE DocTRmNE ITSELF
The proponents of the doctrine of recrimination submit five
principal arguments for its use, aside from the purely historical
view of it as one of our legal traditions.
'43 90 Neb. 148, 133 N.W. 199 (1911).
144 See notes 10-13 supra.
14590 Neb. 148, 133 N.W. 199 (1911).
146 122 Neb. 705, 241 N.W. 279 (1932).
147As has been shown in text supra I, the doctrine of recrimination de-
veloped largely in the ecclesiastical courts, which were empowered only
to grant separation decrees. The doctrine, as illustrated there, was not
considered to be uniformly enforced in the cases of Parliamentary bills
for absolute divorce.
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1. Recrimination as a Facet of the Clean Hands Doctrine
Probably the most frequently cited rationale for the doctrine
of recrimination is that it is the matrimonial court counterpart of
the doctrine of clean hands in other equity cases.148 It should be
remembered, first, that a divorce case cannot be blindly categorized
as just another type of action at equity. Because of the human re-
lationships involved, it is a separate and distinct sort of case which
can be compared with no other field of the law. In addition, the
strict supporters of the doctrine are faced with somewhat of a di-
lemma in arguing the applicability of the clean hands doctrine to
this particular phase of the law, for the doctrine of recrimination
evolved long before equity courts took jurisdiction of matters con-
cerning marriage and divorce. Furthermore, even courts of equity
themselves in dealing with other matters do not insist upon a strict
adherence to the clean hands doctrine when the public interest
will be better served by ignoring the doctrine. For example, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska has stated:149
The maxim [clean hands] quoted being founded on public policy,
public policy may require its relaxation. Even when the parties
have been found to be in pari delicto, relief has at times been
awarded on the ground that in this particular case public policy
has been found to be best conserved by that course. 21 C. J. 189,
sec. 175. Rather, it would seem that the facts before us required
the application of the well established principle: '"Where equity
has assumed to act, it must do complete justice, regardless of
whether litigants originally came into court with unclean hands."
Wenzlaff v. Tripp State Bank, 50 S. Dak. 6.
The late Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., in a series of lectures at the
University of Michigan Law School, stated with regard to the ap-
plication of the clean hands doctrine to divorce actions: 150
If the courts would forget the clean hands doctrine and con-
sider only the policies involved, they might start asking how much
actual good is accomplished by the substantive defense of recrimi-
nation.
And he went on to say:' 5'
... the concentration of judges on the clean hands maxim some-
times does harm by distracting their attention from the basic
policies which are applicable to the situation before them. The
matrimonial suits are a notable example of this bad tendency.
148 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 10.02 (2d ed. 1945).
149 Weavering v. McClennan, 116 Neb. 466, 474, 217 N.W. 956 (1928).
Cf. Menzel v. Niles, 86 Colo. 320, 326, 281 Pac. 364 (1929); and-Saylor v.
Crocker, 97 Kan. 624, 627, 156 Pac. 737 (1916).
150 Chaffee, Some Problems in Equity 81 (1950).
151 Id. at 95.
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It seems illogical, indeed, to presume that the perpetuation of a
union which exists in name and not in spirit is in the interest of
society and of the parties-and it should be remembered that the
purpose of the courts of equity is not to rigidly enforce their own
rules, but rather to remain flexible in the best interests of justice
for all concerned.
2. Recrimination in Relation to Marriage as a Contract
There are those who would urge that the doctrine of recrim-
ination be utilized under the principles of contract law-in other
words, because marriage is contractual in nature, a party breaching
the contract cannot then complain of a breach of that contract by the
other party.152 This philosophy exhibits a rather amazing degree
of naivete in its outlook toward the marital union. While there
are certain elements of the contract in a marriage, and while most
jurisdictions define the marital union as a contractual one in some
sense,153 to look upon it as an impersonal compact certainly ignores
those elements which combine to make a happy marriage, or which
meet head-on in the case of a discordant one. Mr. Justice Traynor,
in DeBurgh v. DeBurgh,15 4 expresses this theory in stating:
The descriptive analogy to contract law ignores the basic fact
that marriage is a great deal more than a contract. It can be termi-
nated only with the consent of the state. In a divorce proceeding
the court must consider not merely the rights and wrongs of the
parties as in contract litigation, but the public interest in the insti-
tution of marriage.... Since the family is the core of our society,
the law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. But when a marriage
has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of
family life are no longer served and divorce will be permitted.
Public policy does not discourage divorce where the relations be-
tween husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of
matrimony have been destroyed.
And in Burch v. Burch'5 5 Judge Maris stated:
The doctrine of recrimination has been rested ... upon the theory
that he who seeks redress for the violation of a contract rest-
ing on mutual and dependent covenants must himself have per-
formed the obligations on his part. But the doctrine of recrimina-
tion in divorce has been much criticized in recent years. For it
ignores the fact that marriage is not a mere private contract but
rather a status of such basic importance in the social structure that
the state has a vital interest in its proper continuance and appro-
152 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation § 343 (1891), and Keezer,
Marriage and Divorce § 55 (2d ed. 1923).
153 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 3 (1895). He feels that the tendency
to regard marriage as a contractual relationship is an unfortunate one, and
that it should be more properly considered a "status."
154 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
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priate termination. From a social point of view it is hard to defend
the rule that recrimination is an absolute bar to the granting of a
divorce for it requires that parties who are guilty of conduct which
makes their marriage impossible of success shall continue their im-
possible marital relationship as a sort of punishment for their
mutual guilt. For this reason the application of the doctrine has
been relaxed as an absolute bar to divorce in a number of jurisdic-
tions.
3. Recrimination to Prevent Repetitive Divorces
Some proponents of the doctrine of recrimination urge that
the application of the doctrine is an effective means of checking
the divorce "repeater," i.e., the person who appears in the divorce
court more than once.15 This was, in fact, apparently one of the
points considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court in the Forburger
case.157 In that case both of the parties had had a previous spouse,
but had obtained divorces from their previous spouses after meet-
ing one another. There the Court stated: 158
Social welfare will best be conserved by compelling parties, with
histories such as these, to remain bound by the marriage ties,
but if their dispositions are such that they cannot live happily
together they should be permitted to live apart.
And in Goings v. Goings5 9 the Court said:
... neither one should be relieved from the restraint of the
marriage relation and permitted to contract new alliances.
The concept of recrimination as a form of "habitual divorcee"
mechanism is perhaps the most meritorious of the arguments in
favor of the doctrine. However, there are two principal objections
to such an approach: (a) it might cause grave harm by fettering
a spouse who has no previous experience in the divorce courts to
a "divorce repeater" and thus would accomplish its end on the
one hand but work an injustice on the other; and (b) it would have
the result of preventing many couples with no previous divorce
155 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952).
156 See McCurdy, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 685, 697 n. 78 (1956).
157122 Neb. 705, 241 N.W. 279 (1932). It is worth noting, however, that
the application of the doctrine does not always have such a deterrent
effect. The parties in Hoffman v. Hoffman, 329 Mich. 486, 45 N.W.2d 366
(1951), for example, were apparently unaffected by the denial of a divorce,
for the plaintiff in that case later filed a second suit for divorce, alleging
additional acts of cruelty subsequent to the prior action. See Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 341 Mich. 225, 67 N.W.2d 206 (1954). And the fact should not
be overlooked that undoubtedly many cases in which recrimination was
originally an issue are refiled on subsequently accrued grounds and never
again reach the appellate level.
158Id. at 708.
159 90 Neb. 148, 133 N.W. 199 (1911).
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records from seeking relief from their mutual unhappiness, unless
the doctrine were applied only to those persons classified as "re-
peaters." If this were the only aim of a recrimination law, surely
the same end could be reached by either preventing the award of
more than X number of divorces to one person (which would still
have the disadvantage stated in (a) above) or, more logically, by
preventing the contracting of more than X number of marriages
by any one person.
4. Recrimination to Preserve the Marriage
In these days of increased emphasis upon the sociological fac-
tors in the law, supporters of the doctrine of recrimination are
quick to proclaim the doctrine (with its cohorts collusion, conniv-
ance and condonation) as one of the last bulwarks against the ever-
increasing divorce rate-recrimination, they say, is the panacea
for the broken home and the element which will force a reconcili-
ation. This school of thought again overlooks the human factor in-
herent in the marriage as a legal entity. If the parties are so ill-
mated that they have reached the divorce courts, a coercive "rec-
onciliation" will be of little avail. The application of the recrim-
ination rule, while failing to preserve the marriage, will probably
succeed in either forcing the parties to seek a divorce by an un-
contested case or through collusive means, or will result in a con-
tinuation of the offenses against the marriage. With respect to
this, it was stated in the DeBurgh case: 16
0
It bears noting how frequently divorces are uncontested. In many
cases neither spouse is "innocent" and yet by agreement one of
them defaults to ensure a divorce. Thus a strict recrimination
rule fails in its purpose of denying relief to the guilty. Moreover,
it exerts a corrupting influence on the negotiations that precede
the entry of such a default. The spouse who more desperately
seeks an end to a hopeless union is penalized by the ability of
the other spouse to prevent a divorce through the assertion of
a recriminatory defense, and the more unscrupulous partner may
obtain substantial financial concessions as the price of remaining
silent. Were the clean hands doctrine properly applied, it would
encourage estranged couples to bring their differences before the
chancellor, where the interests of society as a whole can be given
proper recognition and where settlement negotiations can be super-
vised and unfair advantage prevented.
In Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff'61 the court indicated a similar view
by stating:
From a social point of view it is hard to defend a rule that
recrimination is an absolute bar to the granting of a divorce. It
160 39 Cal. 2d. 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
16 144 F.2d 509 (D. C. Cir. 1944).
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requires parties who are guilty of conduct which makes their
marriage impossible of success to continue their marital relation-
ship as a sort of punishment for their sins.
If the preservation of the marriage is to be a goal of the doc-
trine of recrimination, the courts would be well advised to investi-
gate the possibility of reconciliation of the parties before insisting
that they remain husband and wife. This step has not been taken
by the Nebraska court in any of the recrimination cases, although
it has been a consideration in a divorce action in which there was
a cross-petition for annulment. 162
5. Recrimination in the Interest of Issue of the Marriage
It has also been suggested that children of a marriage are best
protected when the doctrine of recrimination is invoked-that if
for no other reason the doctrine can be justified because it is the
cohesive element that maintains the family unit. It is in this area
that the courts should examine the particular cases with close
scrutiny. Unless there is a real possibility of a true reconciliation
of the parties it seems as though the welfare of the issue of a mar-
riage might be better protected if a divorce were awarded in the
mutual guilt case. If the parents are so unhappy together that they
have found it necessary to resort to the divorce courts, a forced
reconciliation surely cannot afford a child a healthy family back-
ground. There is no guarantee that, upon the denial of a divorce
decree, the parents will resume living together, nor is there any
assurance that if they do resume cohabitation there will be any
degree of tranquility in the home. One must realize that the exist-
ence of a marriage in name is not tantamount to the existence of
a happy home.
In examining the Nebraska cases, no significant conclusions
can be drawn as to the effect of the presence of small children in
the family on the Court's thinking since there have been no issue
in most of the cases involving the doctrine of recrimination. In the
Goings case,'163 however, the parties had a twelve-year-old daughter.
162 Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949). There the
court stated, at 216: "In view of the ages of the parties, the circumstances
under which the marriage occurred (the parties were married upon dis-
covery of plaintiff's pregnancy), the brief period of its duration, the charges
made in this litigation, the nature of the evidence produced, and the feeling
between the families, we do not think a reconciliation will ever be possible.
To leave these young people in a legal position where it will not be pos-
sible to rehabilitate themselves by establishing a home of their own without
such a reconciliation does not seem desirable. We have come to the con-
clusion that the appellee's prayer for absolute divorce should be granted."
163 90 Neb. 148, 133 N.W. 199 (1911).
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Although the court was unwilling to grant an absolute divorce, it
did affirm the award of a divorce a mensa et thoro to the plaintiff
wife, and, in discussing the matter of child custody, stated that the
child's behavior was much improved since living with only her
mother.
VI. A PROPOSED COURSE FOR THE NEBRASKA LAW
A. INTMEPBRTATION OF THE PRESENT LAW
If the Nebraska Supreme Court were inclined to favor an aban-
donment of the doctrine of recrimination, it would be faced with the
question of how far it could proceed toward this end under the
existing statute. By stating that "no divorce shall be decreed in
any case where the party complaining shall be guilty. .... "164
it would appear that the Legislature intended that the denial of a
decree be mandatory in the cases specified, and that the courts
should not possess any discretionary powers in determining whether
or not the doctrine of recrimination should be applied. The courts
would then have to turn to the specified conditions for the applica-
tion of the doctrine, ascertaining how the term "the same crime
or misconduct" should be interpreted. A great deal could be done
toward rejecting recrimination by simply interpreting the statute
as strictly as possible, invoking the statute only when the grounds
for divorce pleaded by the parties were the same grounds (e.g.,
cruelty v. cruelty). One further step could be taken, narrowing the
scope of the statute by applying it only when the same ground ap-
peared in the same degree of severity. However, this course would
be largely designed for the cruelty case, not being particularly
adaptable to the other grounds for divorce; 16 5 and in addition
would be, in effect, utilizing the doctrine of comparative recti-
tude, which would not necessarily be desirable.
Whether intentionally or not, the Nebraska Supreme Court,
and no doubt the district courts as well, apparently closes its eyes
to a potential recriminatory situation if the doctrine is not pleaded.
An examination of the divorce cases.reaching the Nebraska Su-
preme Court during the last few years reveals that in a substantial
number the fact situations indicated that a consideration of the
applicability of the doctrine of recrimination would have been
164 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-304 (Reissue 1952).
16 5 Although it would be a difficult matter to weigh, a distinction could
be made between the person living in adultery and the person merely
committing one adulterous act. However, compare this sort of an approach
with the English attitude described in text, supra, IV, B, 4.
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proper.16 In Cowan v. Cowan, 67 for example, the trial court
awarded a decree of divorce to the defendant on his cross-petition
alleging extreme cruelty, but the Supreme Court reversed, order-
ing an award of an absolute divorce to the plaintiff on the basis of
extreme cruelty. There was ample evidence of physical and verbal
abuse on the part of both parties, but the Supreme Court explained
its decision by this statement, which is not unlike a comparative
rectitude view: 16 8
This physical abuse and cruelty by the defendant of the plaintiff
transcends and outweighs the other alleged acts of the parties.
There was no mention of recrimination in the case. The most
recent decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court are the most strik-
ing examples of an inclination to abandon the doctrine of recrim-
ination. In Dwinnell v. Dwinnell, 69 the matter of recrimination was
not mentioned by the Supreme Court. However, although the Court
upheld the trial court's award of an absolute divorce to the plain-
tiff wife, it also upheld the award of custody of the children to
the husband on the basis of the unfitness of the wife. In describ-
ing this "unfitness" the wife's conduct was characterized as fol-
lows: 170
At one time she stabbed the defendant in the face with a table
fork with such a force that it penetrated his nose. On another
occasion, she threw a fruit jar in defendant's face with such force
that it required several stitches to close the wound. On another
occasion she kicked the defendant in the back with such force
that he was hospitalized for several days....
Yet, in view of such conduct, the doctrine of recrimination was not
brought in as an issue. And in Workman v. Workman, 1" the trial
court denied a divorce to both parties on the basis of their mutual
guilt, recrimination being one of the issues brought before the
Supreme Court of Nebraska on appeal of the case; yet the Supreme
Court awarded an absolute divorce to the plaintiff wife, and failed
to even mention the applicability of the issue of recrimination. It
would be difficult to estimate the number of cases which never pro-
166 See Schlueter v. Schlueter, 158 Neb. 233, 62 N.W.2d 871 (1954); Messer
v. Messer, 157 Neb. 312, 59 N.W.2d 395 (1953); McNamee v. McNamee, 154
Neb. 212, 47 N.W.2d 383 (1951).
167 Cowan v. Cowan, 160 Neb. 74, 69 N.W.2d 300 (1955).
168 Id. at 84.
169 165 Neb. 566, 86 N.W.2d 579 (1957).
170 Id. at 570.
171 164 Neb. 642, 83 N.W.2d 368 (1957).
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ceeded beyond the trial level in which recrimination might have
been an element.
While it is somewhat encouraging to see these indicia of the
cessation of the application of the doctrine of recrimination, the
ignoring either of evidence or of statutory provisions by the courts
certainly is not a desirable judicial result. For this reason, it is sug-
gested that a statutory overhaul is necessary if recrimination is
to be forsaken in Nebraska.
B. A PROPOSED STATUTE
To reject recrimination, one must either entirely abandon the
"fault" or "guilt" concept of divorce, or accept the "mutual fault"
or "mutual guilt" idea. Probably the latter theory is more realistic,
inasmuch as marital discord would not exist were it not for the
fault of one or both of the parties. This does not, however, justify
the predication of a divorce action upon the theory of statutory
wrongdoing. If the legislatures and courts today are sincere in
their desire to convert a divorce action from a purely adversary
proceeding to an honest attempt at either preserving or dissolving
the marriage bond, then they will have to readjust their approach
to the entire concept of the marital entity.172 So long as a divorce
action remains one depending upon the proof by one party of the
"guilt" of the other party, not accompanied by a "mutual guilt,"
then it will remain a remedy which breeds the suppression of truth
and the mushrooming of falsehoods. In order to restore the in-
tegrity to the divorce courts, large scale measures should be taken
to remold the entire theory behind the divorce law.173 In the mean-
thne, however, it is possible to whittle away at the specific ills
in the divorce system. To accomplish this with regard to the doc-
172 The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, has expressed a reluctance
at granting divorces for "sociological reasons"-and no doubt this reticence
is shared by a number of courts throughout the country. See Robinson v.
Robinson, 164 Neb. 413, 82 N.W.2d 550 (1957); Birth v. Birth, 165 Neb. 11, 84
N.W.2d 204 (1957); and Zych v. Zych, 165 Neb. 586, 86 N.W.2d 611 (1957).
173 Judge Paul W. Alexander stated, in the Supp. Report, National Con-
ference on Family Life, Legal Section, American Bar Association, p. 2
(1948): "The marriage fails because of the failure of the individuals who
married. The alleged grounds for divorce are merely the pegs---often arti-
ficial-upon which the decree is hung. The real grounds lie in the character
defects of one or both of the spouses. The drunkenness, cruelty, neglect,
desertion, infidelity, etc., which are the alleged cause of the wrecked
marriage are merely symptoms or outward manifestations of such character
defects.. . ." It is felt that, as expressed by Judge Alexander, that if the
key to the divorce problem is to be found one must go beyond the present
legal framework and examine the real causes of divorce.
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trine of recrimination requires a complete reversal in the concept
of the mutual guilt situation - in other words, instead of the mutual
guilt of the parties resulting in a divorce to neither party, it should
result in the award of a divorce to both.174
Aside from objections on the matter of principle, there are two
main stumbling blocks which the opponents of such a statute would
envision:
1. The Award of Child Custody
In Nebraska, child custody is not determined by the fault or
innocence of either of the parents,175 so it would not be necessary to
have a finding of "fault" before the placement of the child could be
determined. Generally, all other things being equal, custody of a
child is awarded to the mother,17 6 although the recent tendency has
been to place increasing emphasis on the welfare of the child in
ascertaining to whom custody should be granted. 77 In a case in
174 Id. at p. 12, where this statement was made: "I would go further
and abolish the defense of recrimination .... We still adhere to the early
ecclesiastical court philosophy that divorce is only for the 'pure and the
grudging.' * * * Under this doctrine, broadly speaking, no matter how guilty
one party may be, the other party cannot have a divorce if he too is guilty,
even though to a far lesser degree. As a practical matter, judges all over
the country have told me that in contested cases they almost never en-
counter one where the guilt is wholly one-sided. So if the defense of
recrimination is interposed the court is powerless to alleviate the situation
by granting a divorce, yet often where both are guilty there is greater
reason for divorce than when just one is at fault. It seems to me clear
that this defense . . . should be abolished."
175Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-311 (Reissue 1952).
176 Lichtenberg v. Lichtenberg, 154 Neb. 278, 47 N.W.2d 575 (1951). See
also Meredith v. Meredith, 148 Neb. 845, 29 N.W.2d 643 (1947), in which
even the adultery of the mother did not preclude the award of the child
to her. However, the child had been injured at birth and was permanently
handicapped and the evidence showed that the mother was taking ex-
tremely good care of the child, so this may have influenced the court's
decision. But cf. Blid v. Bid, 82 Neb. 294, 117 N.W. 700 (1908), in which
the court refused to grant custody to the mother of a child because she
was living with the child's grandparents, and their home was situated in
the heart of a red light district. There was no evidence of bad character
on the part of either the mother of the child or of the child's grandparents.
177 See Speck v. Speck, 164 Neb. 506, 82 N.W.2d 540 (1957), in which
the original divorce decree awarding custody of five minor children was
modified and the children were placed in the custody of their father in
view of a showing of an improper relationship between the mother and
another man after the rendition of the divorce decree; and Smallcomb v.
Smallcomb, 165 Neb. 191, 84 N.W.2d 217 (1957), in which the Supreme
Court refused to reverse a lower court award of custody of a minor child
to the father on the basis that the welfare of the child would so best be
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which both parties were awarded a divorce, the court would simply
proceed as it does at the present time, granting custody with the
proper diligence in ascertaining the fitness of the parents and the
needs of the child.178
2. The Award of Alimony
As is the case with child custody, in Nebraska the award of
alimony is generally not predicated upon a showing of fault.179
Adultery is the one exception to this rule, 8 0 and alimony may not
be awarded to an adulterous wife.' 8 ' In a case in which both husband
and wife had committed adultery it would probably be best to also
served. However, see also Anderson v. Wilcox, 163 Neb. 883, 81 N.W.2d
314 (1957), in which the Nebraska Court held that the fact that the father
could provide a more comfortable home and could offer the children more
advantages was not a proper basis for modification of the award of custody
to the mother.
178 Campbell v. Campbell, 156 Neb. 155, 55 N.W.2d 347 (1952); Lichtenberg
v. Lichtenberg, 154 Neb. 278, 47 N.W.2d 575 (1951); Hodges v. Hodges, 154
Neb. 178, 47 N.W.2d 361 (1951).
17 9 See Messer v. Messer, 157 Neb. 312, 59 N.W.2d 395 (1953); Forburger
v. Forburger, 122 Neb. 705, 241 N.W. 279 (1932); and Malone v. Malone,
163 Neb. 517, 80 N.W.2d 294 (1957). The standard for determining the
question of alimony was expressed as follows in the Malone case, at p. 520,
quoting from Nickerson v. Nickerson, 152 Neb. 799, 42 N.W.2d 861 (1950):
"'In determining the question of alimony or division of property as be-
tween the parties the court, in exercising its sound discretion, will con-
sider the respective ages of the parties to the marriage; their earning
ability; the duration of and the conduct of each during the marriage; their
station in life, including the social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life
which the wife would probably have enjoyed; the circumstances and neces-
sities of each; their health and physical condition; and their financial cir-
cumstances as shown by the property they owned at the time of the divorce,
its value at that time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether ac-
cumulated or acquired before or after the marriage, the manner in which
it was acquired, and the contributions each has made thereto and, from
all the relevant facts and circumstances relating thereto, determine the
rights of the parties and make an award that is equitable and just.'" In
Specht v. Specht, 148 Neb. 325, 27 N.W.2d 390 (1947) and Martin v. Martin,
145 Neb. 655, 17 N.W.2d 625 (1945), the same standard was used.
180 Although adultery is generally thought of as the only exception tQ
the rule, in Shafer v. Shafer, 10 Neb. 468, 6 N.W. 768 (1880), the wife was
precluded from receiving an alimony award because of her desertion of
her husband.
181 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-318 (Reissue 1952); Meredith v. Meredith, 148 Neb.
845, 29 N.W.2d 643 (1947); Pedersen v. Pedersen, 88 Neb. 55, 128 N.W. 649
(1910); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 26 Neb. 318, 42 N.W. 9 (1889). But see
Bowman v. Bowman, 163 Neb. 336, 79 N.W.2d 554 (1956), where the Court
held that adultery by the "innocent" party in the divorce action after the
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deny alimony. 8 2 The division of property 83 should be determined
with due regard to the property held by each of the parties prior
to the marriage, and the efforts of each in building up the family
property.184
3. The Statute
It is with the background detailed above that the following
statute is suggested for the State of Nebraska: 185
Divorce; mutual misconduct. When it appears to the court,
upon the petitions of the parties or of either of them, that both
of said parties have exhibited misconduct which would constitute
a ground for divorce under the provisions of this Article, then the
court shall award a divorce from the bonds of matrimony to both
of said parties; provided, that in the event of such a decree the
property held by the parties, or by either of them, be it real or
personal, shall be divided in accordance with the order of the court,
with due regard to the property held by each of the parties prior
to the marriage, the diligence of each in assisting in the accumula-
tion of such property, and the welfare of the parties and their issue.
Matters of alimony and the custody and support of issue of the
marriage shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of this Article applying to divorce actions.
issuance of the divorce decree was not a proper basis for revision or termi-
nation of the alimony paid to her even though she was living in a state
of adultery.
182 While this might seem somewhat unfair because a wrongdoing hus-
band would be required to pay nothing toward the support of his spouse,
it -would seem more inequitable to allow an adulteress to receive alimony in
a recrimination situation while denying it where there was no recriminatory
showing.
183 Under the present Nebraska law, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-322 (Reissue
1952), the adultery of the wife will allow her husband to hold certain of
her personal property, but no provision is made for the retention of real
property in such a situation.
184 See DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952). Cf.
Beamer, 10 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 213, 255 (1942). He would have the court
dissolve the marriage on the petition of either party in a mutual guilt
situation, but would use a comparative rectitude approach in the award
of custody of children and of alimony, and of the division of property.
185 Other provisions would, of course, be necessary for making other
portions of the present divorce statutes consistent with this proposal, but
since the purpose of this paper is to deal only with the matter of recrim-
ination, such provisions will not be detailed here.
